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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 - - -
MERLIN DANSIE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
-—000O00 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT 
MERLIN DANSIE 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action initiated by Merlin Dansie for an Order 
restraining Murray City from enforcing its building height restric-
tion ordinances as concerning a storage shed Plaintiff was con-
structing on his residential property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. Plaintiff!s-Respondentfs 
petition of an extraordinary writ was granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks denial of Defendantappellants 
Appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Same as set forth in Defendant's-Appellants Brief, except 
some vital differences, to-wit: 
1. The Garage for which the permit was issued was nearly 
and substantially completed except for putting on top coat of 
the garage* 
2. That the Affidavitsof Mr. Lorin Simper and Mr. Charles 
D. Clay were signed, filed and presented to the Court on the 
date of trial without the opportunity of the Plaintiff to counter 
the Affidavits, or to cross-examine Affiants, having no known 
knowledge of the Affidavits prior to submission to the Court. 
3. That Defendant-Appellant was informed at the time the 
Plaintiff-Respondent issued the building permit, knowledge of 
Section 11 of Ordinance No. 4004, but nothing was said of Section 
of Ordinance No. 4004. 
ARGUMENT 
This matter was submitted to the Court, and the facts 
submitted. Plaintiff was granted the relief prayed. (T-7) The 
Court found in effect that Plaintiff's Petition to be true (T-2 & 
that estoppel should apply, and to do so found sufficient just-
ification to do so. In addition to the foregoing, it is submitted 
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that the ordinance the Appellant contends should be rigidly 
enforced, Section 15 of Ordinance No.4004, is unreasonable. 
Owner A with a one-story high house could not put another 
building on his lot higher than the eves of the house, unless 
he added a second story to his house, even if the building was 
at the back of his lot a half (%) block away, while A's next 
door neighbor, who may own a half (%) mile square lot adjacent 
to A!s lot could put a 30 foot high building within yards of 
A's house if he built his house 30 feet high, on the opposite 
side of his half (%) block square lot. Also, I assume a man 
could not, at any time, build a garage or building first, before 
building his house because there would be no eves to be compared 
to, and what about a basement house? It is submitted that 
limiting the height of buildings to a set heighth to insure con-
formity of a whole neighborhood makes sense, but limiting the 
height of a building such as a garage to the eves of the owner1s 
house when the house ia s low-ranch-type house, and allowing the 
owner across the street, or next door, to go 30 feet high if the 
neighbor can afford to build, or desires to build, a 30 foot high 
house is unreasonable. Limiting all building, including all 
houses to 30 feet high might make sense to control a neighbor-hood, 
but to restrict a man from building his garage to the eves of 
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his 15-foot high house, and to let his next door neighbor 
build to 30 feet high, if he builds a higher house, is unreason-
able. Especially when the 30-foot high garage, could possibly 
be built closer to the low-house than the high-house^ depending 
upon the size of the lots and the location of the houses thereon, 
CONCLUSIONS 
The order of the District Court should be confirmed* 
CT FULLY SUBMITTED 
Jeorg^  
Attorney for'Respondent, 
.4-
